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T H E G R AV I TAT I O N A L P U L L O F R A C E O N T H E WA R R E N C O U RT
The fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Court Review lends itself to "looking backward"
1 to the ferment in constitutional law that began in 1952 with the first oral argument in Brown v Board of Education, 2 and ended twenty-one years later with the plaintiffs' loss in San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez 3 -a ferment that led to the founding of this distinguished journal in 1960 and led me to a career at the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). 4 Much of my work for the ACLU in those heady days was driven by three concerns: (1) opposition to discrimination against black Americans, especially in the South; (2) a perception that many state judges were unable or unwilling to confront issues of racial injustice; and (3) the spectacle of white bureaucracies, especially white police forces, interacting with black citizens, condescendingly, at best; violently, too often.
My thesis in this article is that concern over racial injustice and state institutional failure was so intense during these twenty-one "Warren years" that it played a significant role in shaping many of the most important constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court in areas as diverse as federalism; separation of powers; criminal law and procedure; freedom of speech, association, and religion; procedural due process of law; and democracy. I believe, as well, that at least some of the changes in constitutional doctrine that have taken place in the post-Warren era, such as the erosion of the exclusionary rule, 5 the rebalancing of federal-state power, 6 and the easing of restrictions on aid to parochial schools, 7 reflect both a decrease in the intensity of the Court's concern over racial injustice, and an increase in the legal system's confidence in state and local institutions to act fairly in racially charged settings.
I begin with a summary of selected aspects of Warren Court constitutional doctrine having nothing directly to do with race, arguing that the Justices' concerns over racial injustice and regional failure to deal fairly with race exercised a gravitational pull on the evolution of constitutional doctrine. I then turn briefly to whether such a gravitational pull should be cause for celebration, condemnation, or a shrug of the shoulders. Finally, I ask why, once the gravitational pull of race had ebbed, certain Warren Court constitutional precedents that appear to owe their genesis, at least in part, to concern over racial injustice and regional failure have flourished, while others have melted away. interracial boxing matches. In Florida, black and white students were forbidden to use the same edition of a school textbook. In Arkansas, black and white voters could not enter a polling place in each others' company. In Alabama, a white nurse was forbidden to care for a black male patient. Six states required separate bathroom facilities for black and white employees. In six states, black and white prisoners could not be chained together. In seven states, tuberculosis patients of different races could not be treated together. In eight states, all forms of public recreation-from parks to beaches to ball fields to movie theaters-were racially segregated by law. Ten states required segregated waiting rooms for public transportation. Eleven states required blacks to ride in the back of the bus. Fourteen states segregated railroad passengers by race. Seventeen states mandated racial segregation in public education, while four additional states and the District of Columbia permitted it. A black family thinking about a vacation had to buy a guide to local places where they could eat and sleep. 18 Black musicians and baseball players kept lists of restaurants where they could buy food at the back door. 19 Entire categories of employment were closed to blacks.
20
Racially motivated violence directed at blacks was rampant, especially if they sought to vote in the South. 21 Lynchings of blacks Brown, 118 Harv L Rev 973, 986, 1006 -29 (2005 , refuting the contention in Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality (Oxford, 2004) , that pre-Brown race relations in the South were progressing well and were disrupted by Brown. 18 See Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v United States, 379 US 241, 252-53 (1964) (describing legislative finding about a special guidebook blacks used to travel); Brief for Appellees, Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v United States, No 515, *39-46 & n 31 (filed Sept 28, 1964) (describing legislative hearings on the effects of segregation on travelers and noting existence of a guidebook). 19 Id.
20 See Griggs v Duke Power Co., 410 US 424 (1971) (describing racially tracked employment categories). 21 See 1 1961 Report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 5 ( GPO, 1961) , online at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/cr11961bk1.pdf ("In some 100 counties in eight Southern States there is reason to believe that Negro citizens are prevented-by outright discrimination or by fear of physical violence or economic reprisalfrom exercising the right to vote."); id at 27 (noting threat of violence and activity of the Klan in Monroe County, Alabama); id at 28-29 (describing that "[c] rosses were burned and fire bombs hurled" at registered blacks in Liberty County, Florida); id at 30 (noting "threat of physical violence" in Lee County, Florida); id at 31 (noting "economic or physical were recorded as late as 1964, bringing the shameful documented total to more than 1,500 during the twentieth century. 22 For many Americans in 1952, racial discrimination was a cancer threatening to destroy the nation. Some perceived American racism as a betrayal of the generation that had fought Nazism and had sacrificed so much for American ideals. I remember my father and his friends angrily asking each other why they had gone to war if not to end racism. Some correctly perceived pervasive racial injustice as a threat to national security. Domestically, the Communist Party was able to expand its allure by highlighting its stand against racism. 23 With the Cold War, it became clear that the Soviets were willing and able to use American racism as a powerful weapon against the United States in the worldwide struggle for supremacy. 24 In 1947, Jackie Robinson and Branch Rickey integrated major league baseball. 25 In 1948, President Truman desegregated the armed forces by executive order, 26 and the Supreme Court outlawed reprisals, or threats of such reprisals" to disenfranchise blacks in Mississippi); id at 180 (" [I] n five of seventeen nonvoting counties there were specific incidents of police brutality against Negroes . . . . [I] n four counties reports were received of incidents involving violence against Negroes in which police (apparently deliberately) refused to take action."). 22 See Douglas Linder, Lynchings: By Year and Race (University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law), online at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/shipp/lynchingyear.html. Some consider these numbers to be "conservative." Robert A. Gibson, The Negro Holocaust: Lynching and Race Riots in the United States, 1880 -1950 , Themes in Twentieth Century American Culture, 1979 , online at http://www.yale.edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/1979/2/79.02.04.x.html. 23 The American Communist Party exploited appalling racial incidents like the Scottsboro case to appeal to Americans who had little interest in, or understanding of, the party's economic or revolutionary rhetoric. See generally James Goodman, Stories of Scottsboro (Vintage, 1st ed 1995) . My experience with representing a number of Communist Party members in the 1960s and 1970s was that militant opposition to domestic racial discrimination was the party's most effective recruiting device. 24 See generally Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, 2000) . 25 My longtime colleague at the ACLU, Ira Glasser, has prepared a useful summary of the events leading up to Rickey's decision. Forces, 1940 -1965 (Center of Military History, United States Army, 1985 , online at http://www.history.army.mil/books/integration/iaf-fm.htm, for documentation of the reaction to integration. the enforcement of racially restrictive real estate covenants. 27 In 1950, the Court outlawed racially segregated state law schools. 28 In 1952, the Supreme Court began the process of ending public school segregation in Brown, ushering in an era during which the issues of race and regional failure were catapulted to the center of the nation's consciousness.
Brown triggered an explosion of legal energy that dismantled American apartheid. In 1954, segregated municipal facilities on public land were banned.
29 Segregated public beaches were banned in 1955. 30 Laws requiring blacks to ride in the back of the bus were banned in 1956. 31 But the judicial energy released by Brown was not confined to ending Jim Crow. Brown sparked a remarkable nonviolent movement, centered in the South, aimed at achieving racial equality.
43
Much of the Warren Court's constitutional jurisprudence having nothing formal to do with race was in response to, and in defense of, this struggle for racial justice. When the charismatic influence of the civil rights movement waned-in part, a tribute to its own success; 44 in part, a victim of excesses by others; 45 in part, the result of the assassination of its three great national leaders, John Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and Dr. King; and in part, a victim of the stubborn persistence of racism 46 -post-Warren Court constitutional doctrine often turned back toward pre-Warren standards.
a. race and federalism
The gravitational pull of race is nowhere more evident than in 41 Lee v Washington, 390 US 333 (1968) . 42 County, 391 US 430, 437-38 (1968) . 43 The classic three-volume history of the civil rights movement is Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years: 1954-63 (Simon and Schuster, 1988) ; Taylor Branch, Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years: 1963-65 (Simon and Schuster, 1998); Taylor Branch, At Canaan's Edge: America in the King Years: 1965 -68 (Simon & Schuster, 2006 . See also Juan Williams, Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years, 1954 -1965 (Viking, 1987 , drawn from the six-hour PBS documentary produced by Henry Hampton chronicling the civil rights movement in the South from 1954 South from to 1965 In the wake of President Kennedy's assassination, Congress enacted comprehensive federal laws banning discrimination in employment, housing, voting, and access to federally funded programs. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, codified as amended at 42 USC § § 1971 , 1975a -1975d , 2000a Voting Rights Act of 1965 , Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437, codified as amended at 42 USC § § 1971 , 1973 Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub L No 90-284 the Warren Court's federalism decisions. In the years after Brown, a national consensus emerged that legally reinforced racism was unacceptable; but pockets of intense resistance persisted at the local level, especially in the states of the old Confederacy. 47 Because one of the principal purposes of federalism is to protect local majorities that are out of step with a national majority, the civil rights movement in the South was often on a collision course with federalism. The federalism decisions of the Warren Court, which consistently favored national over state or local institutions, were deeply influenced by the Court's mistrust of the willingness of state and local officials to deal fairly with racially charged issues.
Green v County School Board of New Kent
The Warren Court's race-driven federalism cases begin with Thompson v City of Louisville, 48 which reversed a Louisville police court loitering conviction because of the absence of any evidence of guilt. While the Court's opinion speaks in the racially anodyne language of the Due Process Clause, the Court knew from the briefs that Thompson was a paradigm example of white cops rousting a poor black who then had the effrontery to fight back in court. 49 All too often, state courts were useless in dealing with such race-driven issues-and the Warren Court knew it.
Thompson could be invoked only when there was absolutely no evidence of guilt in the record. 50 Kress & Co., 398 US 144 (1970) , the Court reinforced Monroe with generous pleading rules. The crucial role of the federal district courts in the South in the struggle for racial equality is described in J. W. Peltason, 58 Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation (1961) .
64 379 US 294 (1964) .
application of the public accommodations statute to a motel "readily accessible to" two interstate highways and two state highways. 71 The defendants were acquitted of murder in a Georgia court and then indicted under 18 USC § 241 for conspiring to deprive a black citizen of the right to interstate travel and of equal enjoyment of state-operated facilities.
72 Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, ducked the issue of Congress's power under Section 5, ruling instead that the indictment adequately charged state involvement by alleging that the defendants had filed false reports of illegal activities by the victim. 73 Six Justices held that the allegations implied cooperation by state officials in acting on the false reports, and the remaining three were willing to assume state action.
74 I have defended more than a few criminal cases in my time, but I have never seen a more generous reading of an indictment. 75 67 See id at 243 (describing the motel). 68 See id at 253-38 (determining Commerce Clause gave Congress power to pass Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). I thought then, and think now, that it was a mistake to have avoided the Section 5 issues raised in the public accommodations cases. It was a shame to have wasted the votes when we had them.
69 383 US 745 (1966) . 72 Guest, 383 US at 746-47 (noting indictment); id at 747-48 n 1 (noting that two of the defendants were found not guilty in state court). 73 Id at 756-57 (noting that indictment alleges state action strongly enough to prevent dismissal).
74 Id (Stewart) ; id at 761-62 (Clark, J, joining the opinion and agreeing with Stewart's indictment construction); id at 762 (Harlan, J, concurring and dissenting) (concurring with Part II in which Stewart found enough state action); id at 776 n 1 (Brennan, J, concurring and dissenting) (assuming that the entire indictment could "be construed to show discriminatory conduct by state law enforcement officers"). 75 Justice Harlan, who dissented from Part III in Guest, agreed that the indictment In addition, Justice Stewart recognized a constitutional right to interstate travel that was not dependent on the Fourteenth Amendment, and held that a conspiracy formed with the purpose of interfering with interstate travel fell comfortably within Congress's power to regulate private behavior. 76 In separate opinions, six of the Justices went even further, noting that Congress possesses power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce Section 1 rights against private interference.
77 Congress subsequently read the six concurring votes in Guest as resolving the issue in favor of congressional power.
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Price was an easier federalism case, involving indictments of three local law enforcement officials and fifteen private persons for conspiring to murder three young civil rights workers, Andrew Goodman, Mickey Schwerner, and James Chaney, in Philadelphia, Mississippi, in 1964. 79 The conspiracy involved falsely arresting the civil rights workers, releasing them from jail in the middle of the night, and murdering them as they left town. 80 The Court ruled unanimously that joint public-private behavior aimed at denying constitutional rights was both action "under color of law" for the purposes of 18 USC § 242, and satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment's state action requirement. 81 Finally, in Griffin v implied cooperation by state officials. See id at 762-63, 774 (Harlan, J, concurring and dissenting). 76 Id at 757-60 (discussing right to travel, recent cases such as Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung, and Congress's power to protect against specific intent to interfere with that right). 77 Id at 762 (Clark, J, concurring and dissenting) ("[I]t is, I believe, both appropriate and necessary under the circumstances here to say that there now can be no doubt that specific language of § 5 empowers the Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracieswith or without state action-that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights."); id at 782 (" § 5 authorizes Congress to make laws that it concludes are reasonably necessary to protect a right created by and arising under that Amendment; and Congress is thus fully empowered to determine that punishment of private conspiracies interfering with the exercise of such a right is necessary to its full protection."). 78 In 1968 435 (1970) , the Court's ingenuity ran out, and it upheld a Georgia ruling under the cy pres doctrine that since the terms of the 1911 bequest had become unenforceable, the property reverted to the heirs of the testator. Given the Court's decision the next term in Palmer v Thompson, 403 US 217 (1971) , upholding a decision to close a municipal swimming pool rather than operate it on an integrated basis, the final denouement in Evans is more properly seen as a substantive judgment than a state action case. See also Bell v Maryland, 378 US 226 (1964) (avoiding a ruling on whether the enforcement of trespass laws against sit-in demonstrators constituted state action).
100 365 US 715 (1961) .
Court struck down Mississippi's provision of free textbooks to all schools, both public and private, noting that the technique imperiled the enforcement of Brown by funneling state aid to segregated private schools. 102 In short, the Warren Court's Federalism decisions reflect an unremitting suspicion of state and local institutions in any setting involving race.
b. race and the separation of powers
The Warren Court's separation of powers cases also reflect the gravitational pull of race. In Cooper v Aaron, 103 confronted by a refusal to desegregate a high school in Little Rock, Arkansas, the Court issued the most sweeping assertion of judicial power in the nation's history, insisting that state officials are obliged to comply with the Supreme Court's reading of the Constitution-even in the absence of a court order directing compliance. In Cooper, Little Rock school officials acknowledged a duty to comply with courtordered desegregation. If, however, a black student sought to enroll without a court order, officials often refused admission because, in their opinion, Brown had been wrongly decided. Since, prior to the emergence of the modern class action, it was impossible to supply every black schoolchild with an individual court order, such passive resistance posed a severe hurdle to the implementation of Brown. The Warren Court met the challenge by issuing an opinion signed by all nine Justices reaffirming the Court's support for Brown and treating its reading of the Fourteenth Amendment as the definitive statement of the Constitution's meaning, denying state officials the authority to justify failure to comply with Supreme Court precedent. The adoption of Rule 23(b) (2) 104 in 1966 solved the Brown enforcement problem by authorizing a "civil rights" class action in which one or two students, acting as named plaintiffs, could obtain a court order on behalf of all similarly situated students. 105 The Warren Court's decision to dispense with traditional standing requirements in Flast v Cohen 108 was also driven, at least in part, by concerns over race. Flast authorized a taxpayer to challenge government funding of parochial schools without the necessity of satisfying the usual injury-in-fact requirements. While a principled argument can be made that requiring a plaintiff to allege an injury-in-fact in connection with an Establishment Clause challenge risks pitting religions against each other, the Court's decision to dispense with traditional standing in Flast was designed to counter a key strategy in the South's massive resistance campaign, which was to establish and fund private alternatives to integrated public education.
109 While direct government funding of the "white academies" was quickly found unconstitutional, and indirect funding was ended by cases like Norwood v Harrison, 110 segregationists had two more government-funding strings to their bow-tax deductible private contributions to segregated educa- Col L Rev 323 (2005) . Without the gravitational pull of race, some have suggested that the Due Process Clause requires notice and opt-out in a (b)(2) setting, especially if incidental damages are available. Phillips Petroleum Co. v Shutts, 472 US 797 (1985) . 106 Government assistance to religiously affiliated white academies was even more difficult to counter because it was bound up with the general question of aid to parochial education, and was often disguised as assistance to the free exercise of religion. Flast was designed to make it as easy as possible to challenge state aid to the white religious academies. It turns out that the Catholic parochial schools in Flast may have just been in the wrong place at the wrong time.
The scope of judicial oversight by the Warren Court over the internal workings of the legislative branch was also affected by concerns about race. Ordinarily, it is next to impossible to persuade the Court to involve itself in the internal workings of the legislature. That is why it would be so hard to mount a credible legal challenge to current Senate filibuster rules that allow forty-one senators representing approximately 15 percent of the population to block legislation favored by fifty-nine senators representing approximately 85 percent of the population.
114 During the Warren Court years, though, when racial justice was implicated, the Court overturned the refusal of the Georgia legislature to seat a black legislator, Julian Bond, for supporting draft resisters, 115 379 US 536 (1965) . Cox I was unanimous in finding the breach-of-the-peace statute facially unconstitutional.
133 379 US 559 (1965) . Cox II was 5-4 in overturning convictions for blocking the public way, with the dissenting Justices stressing the fact-intensive nature of the as-applied issue and the difficulty of substituting the Court's post hoc fact-finding for the reasonable fears of the police.
Court reversed the convictions of 2,000 black student demonstrators who had refused to end a demonstration, in the vicinity of a courthouse, protesting the arrests of twenty-three students for picketing stores with segregated lunch counters. In Gregory v Chicago, 134 confronted with a fact pattern considerably more incendiary than in Feiner, Chief Justice Warren found it an "easy case" to reverse the convictions of eighty-five civil rights marchers, led by comedian Dick Gregory, who peacefully marched in support of public school desegregation from City Hall to the home of Mayor Daley, and then refused a police order to disperse when confronted by a crowd of 1,000 hostile "unruly" onlookers. 151 concerns over separation of powers and federalism had rendered judicial protection of the right of blacks to vote in state and local elections largely ineffective. 152 Where racially discriminatory purpose was evident, as in Terry v Adams 153 and Gomillion v Lightfoot, 154 the Court was able to provide relief. In the many cases where discriminatory racial purpose was not self-evident, however, proving it was virtually impossible, especially in settings where sophisticated officials took pains to cover their tracks. 155 Faced with massive disenfranchisement of blacks in the South, and the difficulty of proving discriminatory purpose, the Warren Court pushed the reset button. 156 In Carrington v Rash, 157 Texas forbade soldiers assigned to duty in the state from voting, creating a conclusive presumption that they were not bona fide residents of Texas. It was no coincidence that so many of the soldiers were black. 158 Lacking proof of discriminatory purpose, it was impossible to bring a successful Fifteenth Amendment challenge to the Texas ban. So, the Warren Court started down the road of "fundamental rights" jurisprudence, enabling the Court to protect minority voting rights by imposing strict scrutiny on any effort to selectively apportion the franchise. The Warren Court repeated the process in Harper v Virginia Board of Elections, 159 which invalidated Virginia's $1.50 poll tax. Once again, a Fifteenth Amendment challenge would have failed in the absence of proof of discriminatory purpose. Harper was particularly difficult because, in 1937, the Court had unanimously upheld the constitutionality of state poll taxes in Breedlove v Suttles, 160 and the TwentyFourth Amendment, which abolished poll taxes in federal elections, had refrained from extending the ban to the states, creating an inclusio unis textual problem. Indeed, Justice Stewart, who wrote for the Court in Carrington, dissented in Harper. But the Warren Court's majority sensed a "one-two" punch in Carrington and Harper that would eliminate the traditional impediments to black voting without requiring proof of discriminatory purpose.
161
A similar process led to Baker v Carr. 162 Although the one-person one-vote cases say nothing explicit about race, the issue that drove the cases was pervasive legislative malapportionment throughout the South-and parts of the North-that dramatically overrepresented rural whites at the expense of underrepresented urban and rural blacks. 163 In Gomillion, the Court confronted an obvious racial 158 Once President Truman had desegregated the armed forces, a military career became relatively attractive to many black Americans because civilian employment continued to struggle with racism. Moreover, the military draft during the 1960s tended to overrepresent black youths, since student and other deferments were more easily obtained by middleand upper-class whites. Jonathan Sutherland, 2 African Americans at War: An Encyclopedia 502 (ABC- CLIO, 2006) . 159 383 US 663 (1966) .
160 302 US 277 (1937) . 161 The Warren Court quickly built on Carrington, 380 US 89 (1965), and Harper, 383 US 663 (1966) , to announce a general constitutional right to vote and to run for office in Williams v Rhodes, 393 US 23 (1968 ), Kramer v Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 US 621 (1969 ), and Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330 (1972 .
162 369 US 186 (1962) . 163 See C. Herman Pritchett, Equal Protection and the Urban Majority, 58 Am Pol Sci Rev 869, 869-71 (arguing that the Supreme Court's decisions on legislative districting and apportionment must be taken in the context of a predominantly black urban majority and are a continuation of its 1950s decisions on racial inequality). See also Richard C. Cortner, The Apportionment Cases (Tennessee, 1970) ; Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Democratic gerrymander, making it possible to invoke the Fifteenth Amendment. But the facts of Baker v Carr made it impossible to apply the Fifteenth Amendment. The result was the development of the doctrine of one-person one-vote, enforceable without any need to prove a racially discriminatory purpose. Indeed, it is the gravitational pull of race that explains why, despite the analogy to the United States Senate, the Court was adamant in Reynolds v Sims 164 in denying Alabama's effort to apportion one house of its bicameral state legislature to reflect geographical or other non-populationbased factors. The Court's effort to assure black citizens fair legislative representation would have been derailed if one house of the state legislature was permitted to remain a malapportioned bastion of white power. 165 e. race, freedom of religion, and due process of law
The Warren Court determination to enforce Brown also played a role in shaping its Establishment Clause jurisprudence. As we have seen, Flast v Cohen eliminated standing as a barrier to the effective enforcement of the ban on government aid to segregated white academies masquerading as religious parochial schools. Justice Brennan's influential concurring opinion in Abington v Schempp 166 sought to build an impermeable wall through which government funds could never pass to a racially segregated private religious school.
Race also may have exercised a gravitational pull on Warren Court Free Exercise jurisprudence. It was no coincidence that the plaintiff in Sherbert v Verner 167 was a Seventh Day Adventist from South Carolina seeking employment benefits. Sherbert fits closely with Goldberg v Kelly, 168 the Warren Court's principal procedural due process decision. Both opinions by Justice Brennan were designed to empower a black underclass deeply dependent on government benefits that too often were administered by unsympathetic or even racist white bureaucracies. The introduction of procedural due process guaranties into school disciplinary proceedings in Goss v Lopez 169 was also driven by concerns over race. My first federal trial involved an ugly attempt to prevent the integration of a New York City high school by expelling large numbers of black students for alleged truancy. I could not prove racially discriminatory purpose, although the situation reeked of racism. Instead, I argued successfully that the expelled students had been denied procedural due process of law. 
f. race and criminal law and procedure
Perhaps the clearest evidence of the gravitational pull of race on Warren Court constitutional doctrine was in the areas of criminal law and procedure. It is hard to overstate the sense of urgency driving the Court's concern over racial discrimination in the enforcement of the criminal law. The perception-and, too often, the reality-was of white police forces applying racially discriminatory standards in daily street encounters with black citizens, the widespread discriminatory use of force, and the selective prosecution of crime. The sense of crisis was particularly acute in the urban ghettos, which eventually burst into open rebellion. 171 We have already seen how the notion of white law enforcement officials unfairly treating black citizens played out in the specialized world of the First Amendment. 172 The Warren Court generalized the response in a series of cases designed to limit the power of the police to initiate street encounters in the absence of a legitimate law enforcement justification. is one example of the Court's response. But Thompson, standing alone, was unlikely to make a serious dent in the problem. In cases beginning with Papachristou v City of Jacksonville, 174 the Court turned to the Due Process Clause to invalidate vague ordinances that provided the police with carte blanche to stop blacks on the streets, especially in white areas.
The Warren Court's most dramatic responses to law enforcement's interaction with the black population were the Court's efforts in Mapp v Ohio 175 to prevent the use of illegally obtained evidence in criminal proceedings, and in Miranda v Arizona 176 to impose prophylactic rules on police interrogations. Race was not far from the surface of either case. In Terry v Ohio, 177 the Court sought to split the difference between the loitering and vagrancy decisions and the strict Fourth Amendment probable-cause test by authorizing the police to make investigatory street stops on less than probable cause, but only if they can demonstrate an "articulable suspicion" of unlawful activity. Finally, the right to counsel cases from Gideon to Argersinger were driven, in part, by concern over a criminal justice system where white judges and prosecutors processed poor, unrepresented blacks and Hispanics.
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II. Post-Warren Court Jurisprudence: When Gravity Ebbed
In the post-Warren Court years, once the gravitational pull of race and regional institutional mistrust had ebbed, much, but not all, of the jurisprudence described in Part I lost its vitality. In the federalism area, dyman. 188 Similarly, the post-Warren Court rejected the one-way ratchet concept of South Carolina v Katzenbach, 189 returning to the more traditional view that Section 5 enforcement statutes must be closely tethered to Section 1 rights. 190 Several members of the postWarren Court expressed buyer's remorse about the broad construction of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
191 Indeed, with the success of the Voting Rights Act in enfranchising and empowering black voters, several members of the current Court have called for a reexamination of the constitutionality of the preclearance rule of Section 5 and the Congressionally imposed effects test of Section 2. 192 As with the federalism cases, once the gravitational pull of race ebbed, post-Warren Court separation-of-powers decisions tended to revert to pre-Warren Court standards. The Establishment Clause standing rules tightened, 193 and the Court reverted to its traditional "hands off" stance when asked to interfere with the internal workings of the political branches. 194 In the First Amendment and democracy areas, without the gravitational pull of race, the Court, over Justice Brennan's dissent, declined to extend Times v Sullivan 195 to speech about public issues, 196 wobbled on its commitment to anonymity, 197 rediscovered the right of members of a political party to exclude outsiders, 198 declined to consider the constitutionality of massive political gerrymanders, 199 and eased the standards on state and local apportionment. 200 In Shaw v Reno, 201 a Supreme Court majority with a very different view of the relationship between constitutional doctrine and the achievement of racial justice forbade the drawing of legislative lines designed to favor formerly disenfranchised black voters. The fault line between the majority and dissent in Shaw was whether the effort to achieve racial justice would continue to exercise a gravitational pull on constitutional doctrine. Five Justices in Shaw said no.
Without the gravitational pull of race, substantial government aid is now available to religious schools, 202 we are on the cusp of overturning Flast, 203 the Court's toleration of vague and arguably overbroad statutes has markedly increased, 204 and the Court has systematically loosened the constitutional bonds limiting searchand-seizure and police interrogation. 205 Some might object at this point that the Justices' differing perceptions about race and regional failure had little or nothing to do with the shift in constitutional doctrine in the post-Warren years. All that happened, they might argue, was that President Lyndon Johnson and Justice Abe Fortas badly botched the succession when Chief Justice Warren announced his resignation in 1968, 206 handing President Nixon four Supreme Court appointments and the chance to reconstitute the Court's political and philosophical underpinnings. 207 That's all true, of course. But it does not alter my point on the shift in the gravitational pull of race and regional failure. A Justice's political orientation and judicial philosophy are, after all, merely shorthands for underlying beliefs (often intuitively held) about things like the relative importance of equality and autonomy, the relative spheres of democratic decision making and principled judicial articulation, the relative risks and benefits of central and local power, the relative effectiveness of collective and individual action, the relative weight of environmental determinism and individual effort, the relative importance of procedural regularity and substantive outcome, and the relative costs and benefits of government and private regulation. When President Nixon appointed four new Justices with new (and mutually different) value orientations, he inevitably changed the intellectual prism through which the gravitational pull of the nation's struggle for racial justice, especially in the South, operated on the Supreme Court. That, in turn, affected the evolution of constitutional doctrine.
By the mid-1970s, many believed that Brown and its progeny,
208
coupled with Congressional enactment of much of the civil rights agenda during the 1960s, 209 had ameliorated the worst of the nation's racial crisis, and that generational change had rendered state institutions more willing and able to shoulder the burden of acting responsibly in dealing with racially charged issues. Thus, even if the Supreme Court's membership had remained stable, I suspect that at least several Justices might have become more skeptical over whether the quest for racial justice should continue to play such a dominant role in constitutional analysis across the board. 210 But the 206 The failed effort to elevate Justice Fortas to the Chief Justice position and his forced resignation from the Court is described in Bruce Allen Murphy, Fortas: The Rise and Ruin of a Supreme Court Justice (William Morrow, 1988 209 See above at n 44.
210 While Justice Brennan, often joined by Justice Marshall and by one or two other Justices, consistently dissented from the constitutional backsliding, I wonder if they would have been as wedded to the body of 1960s precedent if they had been in a position to tweak it to their liking.
Court's membership did not remain stable. The newly appointed Justices viewed the already somewhat weakened argument for continuing to place racial justice and regional failure at the center of the Court's constitutional agenda through their own political and philosophical filters, and virtually zeroed out the search for racial justice and the fear of regional failure as significant tie-breaking factors in developing new constitutional doctrine. I do not suggest that the new Justices were unconcerned about racial justice; merely that their perception of the diminished intensity of the nation's racial crisis, factored through the new Justices' hierarchically ordered value systems, did not impel them in the direction of shaping constitutional doctrine with an eye to its effect on the civil rights struggle.
Given my value orientation, I think the new Justices gave up too soon on the primacy of achieving racial justice, and overvalued the willingness and ability of local institutions to deal effectively with racially charged issues. The Warren Court repeatedly treated the achievement of equality, principally racial equality, as its prime constitutional value. In the post-Warren era, Justice Brennan's dissents continued to do so, describing a constitutional world that might have been, not just for racial minorities, but for women and other historically subordinated groups-a world in which a benign local majority could actively help the minority to achieve real equality, 211 and where politically weak groups could appeal from hostile or unconcerned local majorities to a more responsive national majority. 212 My disagreement with many of the post-Warren Court decisions rejecting that world, often by narrow 5-4 majorities, does not spring from a belief that Justice Brennan was objectively correct, or that the post-Warren majority Justices were objectively wrong. While Justice Brennan continued to place equality-especially racial equality-at the top of the constitutional tree, the post-Warren Court majority increasingly turned toward autonomy as its prime constitutional value. Both approaches are defensible efforts at con-211 Parents Involved in Community Schools v Seattle School District No. 1, 551 US 701 (2007) (Breyer, J, dissenting); Shaw v Reno, 509 US 630, 658 (1993) (White, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ, dissenting) ; id at 679 (Souter, J, dissenting); Gratz v Bollinger, 539 US 244 (2003); Metro Broadcasting Co. v FCC, 497 US 547 (1990 ), rev'd Adarand Constructors, Inc. v Pena, 514 US 200 (1995 .
212 Morrison v United States, 529 US 598, 628 (2000) (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ, dissenting); Bray v Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 US 263, 288 (1993) (Souter, J, dissenting in part); id at 307 (Stevens and Blackmun, JJ, dissenting); id at 345 (O'Connor, J, dissenting). struing the Constitution. Indeed, over time, one would expect equality and autonomy, two of the leading candidates for prime constitutional value (procedural regularity being the third), to coexist uneasily with each other. Who is to say for certain which one should trump the other at any given point in the nation's history? As many have noted, since plausible arguments that almost always exist on both sides of a hard constitutional case, insistence on socalled objectively correct answers rooted in textual literalism, or law-office history often do little more than mask a Justice's choice of a prime value. That is why I find shrill assertions that externally mandated, objectively correct "originalist" answers exist in the Constitution's text and history so unpersuasive-and so intellectually dishonest.
213 That is also why winning presidential elections is so important to the evolution of constitutional law.
III. So What?
If I am right that concerns over racial injustice and regional failure significantly influenced the Warren Court's constitutional decision making, at least three reactions are possible 214 -condemnation, praise, or the less elegant "so what." Some observers would undoubtedly condemn the Warren Court's willingness to shape constitutional doctrine in aid of racial justice as an unprincipled exercise in political jurisprudence. 215 Others would view the Court's raceconscious constitutional jurisprudence as judicial statesmanship of the highest order. 216 Most, I believe, would shrug their shoulders 213 For a summary of the seemingly endless debate over originalism, see Steven G. Calabresi, ed, Originalism: A Quarter Century of Debate (Regnery, 2007) . For a useful recent symposium on originalism, see http://www.harvard.jlpp.com?archive/#313. 214 Another response, of course, is to reject my hypothesis about the gravitational pull of race as wrong, or, more charitably, unproven. I concede that I have not attempted to control for other variables that might explain changes in constitutional doctrine as the Court's personnel altered, like increases or decreases in legal acumen, changes in judicial philosophy, and shifts in political orientation. I have argued above that the altered political views and judicial philosophies of the new Justices merely provided the intellectual lens through which they measured whether racial injustice and regional breakdown continued to be important enough to outweigh other factors in forging constitutional doctrine. at what they would see as the inevitability of this process. 217 This is not the place to rehash either the lament over the decline of "neutral principles" in Brown or the defense of the Court's role in helping the nation to begin its redemption from racism. Nor is it the place to rehash the argument over whether the Constitution's text or history actually provide binding commands to the Justices in hard cases. Suffice it to say that, today, even the most committed formalists embrace constitutional doctrine requiring a pragmatic, fact-bound balancing of public need against private right. Whether one looks at the First Amendment's weighted balancing test, 218 the notions of "reasonableness" underlying the Fourth Amendment, 219 or the varying iterations of Equal Protection scrutiny, 220 today's judges are knee deep in factual assessments of the impact of constitutional doctrine on the real world.
Three comparatively recent events must have-and should have-had a significant influence on the Supreme Court's reading of the Constitution. The first was the Great Depression. It is now commonly accepted that constitutional doctrine evolved during the Depression in response to a crisis in which market failure appeared to cry out for federal regulation, in part because of problems of scale, in part because the states were trapped in a regulatory race to the bottom in pursuit of a shrinking pool of jobs and investment. The result was the evolution of constitutional doctrine from Lochner, 221 227 Once the twin pressures of economic crisis and perceived state regulatory incapacity abated, constitutional doctrine began taking federalism, separation-of-powers, and regulatory immunity claims more seriously again. 228 The second was World War II (WW II) and the Cold War, with the nation struggling, first, for military survival; and, then, for worldwide ascendancy during a half century of almost uninterrupted international conflict that demanded a strong national government and led many to argue for the subordination of individual rights. The result was cases like Gobitis, 229 Korematsu, 230 Yakus, 231 and Dennis. 232 It is fashionable today to feign astonishment that the Court could have gotten Korematsu so wrong, but that is because the gravitational pull that led Justice Black to write the Korematsu opinion, and Justice Douglas to join it, has long since disappeared. 233 The third was the moral crisis over race relations that gripped the nation in the aftermath of WW II. The result was Brown and many of the Warren Court's decisions discussed above.
Whether or not one agrees with the Supreme Court's reactions to these three crises, I find it impossible to imagine (much less be part of) a constitutional regime that claims to operate in splendid isolation from the existential crises that swirl about it. Bruce Ackerman has constructed a theory of implied constitutional amendment to explain and legitimate the Court's response to the Depression. 234 My colleagues Richard Pildes and Samuel Issacharoff have suggested the existence of an implied emergency switch in the Constitution, analogous to the explicit emergency clauses in many European constitutions that justify altered constitutional doctrine during a national security crisis. 235 Finally, David Strauss has persuasively argued that the Warren Court's approach to constitutional adjudication was driven by the same forces that cause the common law to evolve. 236 My "gravitational pull" approach could be shoehorned into either Ackerman's idea of a "constitutional moment," or the Pildes/Issacharoff idea of implied emergency power. I prefer, however, to avoid formal claims that the Constitution itself changes in response to external events in favor of a weaker claim closer to David Strauss's that the Justices' reading of ambiguous constitutional provisions in hard cases will inevitably reflect pragmatic responses to perceived crises. For me, the harder issues raised by the Warren Court's response to racial injustice and regional failure are: (1) how to decide when circumstances or events are sufficiently critical to exert a legitimate gravitational influence on constitutional decision making, (2) how to decide when such a gravitational pull is no longer warranted, and (3) what to do with precedents that have emerged, at least in part, under the influence of a gravitational pull that has ebbed or ceased entirely.
I find the first two questions fascinating, but ultimately beyond the lawyer's craft. The question of when a national crisis achieves sufficient social mass to justify exerting a significant gravitational pull on constitutional doctrine cannot be reduced to a legal formula. It depends on the perceptions of the Justices and the ethos of the community. Racial discrimination in the 1930s was just as important to the nation and just as morally reprehensible as it was in the 1950s, but it took the psychological impact of a costly war against Nazi racism, 237 a major internal and external threat from the Soviet Union, and the growth of a great national political movement for the concepts of racial injustice and regional failure to coalesce to the point where a national crisis over race exercised a sustained gravitational pull on constitutional doctrine. Most national issues, even when passionately felt and argued, are comparative tempests in teapots, unlikely to generate the sustained public passion and judicial concern that are needed to fuel a significant impact on judge-made constitutional doctrine.
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The closely related question of whether (and when) a crisis has ebbed sufficiently to lose its power to influence constitutional doctrine is also incapable of formal legal measurement. I believe passionately that many Justices turned away from the pursuit of racial justice too soon. But the choice between "benign neglect" and affirmative action was, at bottom, fundamentally political. For good or ill (and for many reasons), American society lost its intense focus on racial injustice and its intense mistrust of regional southern justice. Once that happened, the gravitational pull of the quest for racial justice on constitutional doctrine inevitably ebbed in ways that left lawyers like me largely out of the equation. 237 The losses suffered by ordinary Americans in the struggle to defeat Hitler and Imperial Japan were very substantial. The United States suffered 131,000 battle deaths, and an additional 400,000 war-related deaths, to say nothing of the maiming and pain of more than 500,000 battle wounds. See Michael Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500 -2000 (McFarland, 2002 . A people will seek to give meaning to losses of such magnitude by infusing the struggle with moral teaching that shapes the post-loss society-at least for a while. Witness the post-Civil War fervor that resulted in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, and the post-Great War idealism that gave rise to the League of Nations. 238 But that raises a closely related question-should a Justice acknowledge the influence of a crisis on the decisional process? In those settings where a crisis operates under a Justice's conscious radar, it is meaningless to talk of acknowledgment. There is nothing to acknowledge. In many cases, though, I think that the Warren Court knew exactly what it was doing. The Justices' opinionsespecially the factual recitations-occasionally signal to an attentive reader that race and the fear of regional failure are playing roles in the Justices' reasoning.
239 Sometimes, though, the Justices' opinions are completely silent about the racial context of a case, even when the briefs must have made the racial implications clear. 240 Most importantly, almost never does a Justice openly acknowledge that concerns about an opinion's impact on race or regional failure are playing a role in the case's outcome. 241 In retrospect, I believe that the Warren Court's jurisprudence in many areas would have been more convincing and less controversial if the Court had acknowledged a crisis-bound necessity for reading the Constitution to avoid regional breakdown in the struggle for racial justice. During the Depression, the Court explained why it was impossible to retain the old federalism and separation-of-powers models. Candor over the impact of wartime crisis on judicial thinking is the only good thing I can say about Korematsu. A little of that candor would have strengthened the Warren Court. Justices who claim the power to construe a "living Constitution" should explain why their Constitution has adopted a particular lifestyle.
The third question-how to deal with constitutional precedent that appears to have been influenced by some event or crisis once the gravitational pull has ebbed-is, however, largely a lawyers' issue. Post-Warren Court decisions in at least five areas-freedom of speech, freedom from religion, federalism, separation of powers, and criminal law and procedure-may shed some light on the issue. While Warren Court free speech doctrine has prospered, going on 239 See, for example, United States v Price, 383 US 745 (1966); United States v Guest, 383 US 787 (1966) . 240 See, for example, Thompson v City of Louisville, 363 US 199 (1960); Monroe v Pape, 365 US 167 (1961) .
241 I suspect it is because they were bluffed away from the table by Herbert Wechsler and friends. It is the same self-protective but ultimately hypocritical behavior that has led all Supreme Court nominees since Robert Bork to engage in the charade of the modern Senate confirmation hearing, where the nominees fervently promise to apply the law, but duck questions about how they will determine what the law is in hard cases.
would neither expect nor wish the precedent to outlive the crisis. Don't get me wrong. I do not suggest that the Warren Court's race-driven decisions were wrong. They were necessary to deal with a genuine breakdown in the rule of law. I do suggest, though, that several were crisis-driven and crisis-bound. Where, however, the Warren Court's intense concern over racial justice and regional failure operated as a magnifying glass, 252 sharpening the Justices' perception of the necessity for principled constitutional protection against government overreaching, the decisions deserve, and have received, respect long after the crisis about race and regional failure that gave them life has subsided.
In the free speech, criminal law, and due process cases, the Justices' concern over race and regional failure often acted as just such a magnifying glass, assisting the Court in recognizing the extent to which government behavior was deviating in important ways from the purpose of a given constitutional provision. Wainwright, 256 and Papachristou v Jacksonville, 257 the Warren Court rooted its race-sensitive decisions in principled and persuasive intellectual models that reflected the underlying purpose of the relevant constitutional text. As a consequence, those opinions have had staying power long after the Court's concern over racial injustice has-rightly or wrongly-passed into history. On the other hand, several federalism and Establishment Clause decisions that appear to have been almost wholly instrumental have lacked sustained staying power once the gravitational pull of race diminished.
258
For example, Times v Sullivan 259 almost certainly was influenced in the short term by a desire to protect the civil rights movement in the South, but was rooted in a free marketplace of ideas model of the First Amendment that, while contestable, resonated with our constitutional traditions and advanced the First Amendment's basic 252 I am grateful to Geoff Stone for the metaphor.
253 376 US 254 (1964) . 254 397 US 358 (1970) . 255 397 US 254 (1970) . 256 372 US 335 (1963) . 257 405 US 156 (1972) . 258 As I have noted, I believe that the Court turned away from the gravitational pull of racial equality much too soon.
259 376 US 254 (1964) . race and regional failure; rightly decided for their time, but timeand crisis-bound. Once states appeared ready to shoulder the burden of race, the post-Warren Court quickly gave them back many of their traditional powers. 267 Similarly, once the Establishment Clause was no longer seen as necessary to protect Brown, it was only a matter of time before Flast, which was largely instrumental, was put into play. Finally, as police forces integrated and state judiciaries turned over generationally, the crisis-driven prophylactic norms announced in Mapp and Miranda evolved. Mapp and Miranda operate on two levels. As dramatic prophylactic responses to an institutional breakdown in the relationship between local police forces and black citizens, both cases are rooted in a time and place.
268 Both opinions were, however, also rooted in a deeply principled constitutional understanding of the relationship between the state and the individual, an understanding that forbids the state from benefiting from its own wrongdoing. That important constitutional principle fuels the enduring staying power of both cases and explains why, once the gravitational pull of race ebbed, both cases have evolved toward requiring blameworthy conduct by a government official.
IV. Conclusion
I have tried to tell a story of the evolution of race-driven constitutional doctrine during and after the Warren Court in three stages: (1) a fully warranted response to a national crisis about race and regional failure, (2) the time-bound nature of those primarily instrumental decisions seeking to deal with the crisis, and (3) the staying power of constitutionally principled responses. While my story is a far cry from contemporary fantasies of objective commands unambiguously embedded in the constitutional text and history, or overarching theories of constitutional meaning, it reflects my dayto-day experiences as a foot soldier in the constitutional trenches for forty-six years and more than 500 constitutional cases. Of course, my trench-bound perspective may have blinded me to the grand designs of the general staff. But maybe there is no general staff, 267 See text accompanying notes 184-212. 268 I believe that the Court has seriously underestimated the continuing need for prophylaxis in dealing with police interactions with racial minorities, but that's just me arguing for the continued gravitational pull of race.
